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The	UK	state	after	COVID-19:	Britain	needs	a	system
of	government	which	is	holistic,	anticipatory,	and
intelligent
While	Cummings’s	vision	for	reforming	government	looks	even	more	questionable	in	the	light	of	the
pandemic,	it	is	not	sufficient	simply	to	attack	ideas	of	reform,	writes	Patrick	Diamond.	He	explains
what	system	of	government	Britain	needs	in	order	to	be	better	able	to	solve	problems	in	the	future.
Although	Dominic	Cummings	remains	the	Prime	Minister’s	Chief	Political	Adviser,	the	UK
Government’s	perceived	mishandling	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic	means	the	vision	of	a	reformed
British	state	he	championed	now	appears	threatened.	Certainly,	Cummings’s	quest	to	reinvent	UK
governance	attracted	considerable	attention	in	the	pre-pandemic	era.	In	the	aftermath	of	Brexit,
there	was	a	growing	belief	within	the	governing	class	that	Britain	had	to	be	remade	as	a	high-tech	‘Singapore	on
Thames’:	a	deregulated,	globalised	competition	state	liberated	from	the	shackles	of	Europe.	The	UK	state	machine,
it	was	said,	was	slow-moving	and	cumbersome,	afflicted	by	chronic	‘bureaucratic	cancer’.	Many	civil	servants	cared
little	about	delivering	reforms,	while	politicians	proved	to	be	weak	Ministers	with	little	experience	of	running	complex
organisations.	Mr	Johnson’s	Strategy	Chief	wanted	‘wild	card’	advisers	in	Downing	Street,	data	scientists,
engineers	and	physicists	who	epitomised	the	spirit	of	‘techno-optimism’.	The	permanent	civil	service,	Cummings
declared	was,	‘one	for	the	history	books’.	The	centre	of	government	ought	to	be	run	in	a	hyper-active	style	akin	to	a
Silicon	Valley	start-up	where,	‘only	the	paranoid	survive’.
In	fact,	many	of	those	who	previously	served	in	government	expressed	sympathy	with	the	critique	of	the	British	civil
service	and	the	Whitehall	tradition.	It	is	striking	that	Geoff	Mulgan,	Tony	Blair’s	former	Director	of	Strategy,	believed
Cummings	was	essentially	right	to	be	concerned	with	how	government	operated,	and	that	it	was	necessary	to	bring
new	people,	energy	and	ideas	into	the	UK	executive.	On	the	basis	of	his	experience,	Mulgan	agreed	that	the
number	of	Ministers	in	Whitehall	ought	to	be	cut	drastically,	while	civil	service	roles	should	be	reconfigured	to	focus
on	practical	implementation	rather	than	giving	abstract	policy	advice.	Yet	what	emerged	from	Cummings	are	ideas
for	reforming	government	that	now	look	more	questionable	in	the	light	of	the	pandemic,	and	the	strains	it	has
imposed	on	society,	the	economy,	and	state.
The	first	issue	is	that	while	attacking	Whitehall	mandarins	often	wins	favour	among	editorial	leader-writers,	it	is
focusing	on	the	wrong	problem.	The	dysfunctionality	of	the	British	system	of	government	is	at	least	as	much
concerned	with	politics	as	the	condition	of	the	permanent	bureaucracy.	The	political	incentives	in	the	UK	system
serve	to	reinforce	chronic	short-termism,	not	least	in	ensuring	that	policy	change	is	almost	always	aligned	with	the
electoral	cycle.	Ministers	who	fall	out	of	favour	with	Number	Ten	can	be	briefed	against	and	then	sacked,	which
militates	against	any	serious	effort	at	risk-taking	and	innovation.	Downing	Street	is	obsessed	with	the	presentation
of	policy.	As	a	consequence,	government	at	the	centre	is	too	often	afflicted	with	the	culture	of	blame	avoidance	and
excessive	political	partisanship.
The	second	major	problem	is	the	lack	of	serious	thinking	about	how	to	improve	the	delivery	of	public	policy.	For	all
the	commitment	to	transformational	change	in	British	government,	there	is	a	recurrent	belief	that	a	small	group	of
clever	advisers	at	the	centre	can	manage	the	machinery	of	state	and	drive	through	policy	reforms.	This	mind-set
has	been	exposed	repeatedly	as	naïve	and	counter-productive.	The	problem	is	epitomised	by	the	continuing
reliance	on	targets	to	improve	public	services.	There	is	too	little	appreciation	of	the	distortive	effects	of	targets	at	the
centre,	as	captured	in	Goodhart’s	law:	‘When	a	measure	becomes	a	target,	it	ceases	to	be	a	good	measure’.
Targets	encourage	public	service	professionals	to	‘game’	performance,	distorting	activity	to	meet	the	prescribed
target;	targets	then	lead	Ministers	to	lose	focus	on	what	actually	matters,	as	seems	to	have	occurred	in	the
management	of	the	care	home	sector	during	the	pandemic.	Observing	the	government	recently	has	at	times	been
akin	to	watching	a	slow-motion	train-crash,	where	Ministers	desperately	pull	levers	but	discover	that	in	fact,	they	are
barely	connected	to	anything.
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The	underlying	intellectual	problem	is	that	the	current	Administration	is	still	wedded	to	the	public	choice	doctrines	of
New	Public	Management	(NPM)	which	emphasise	not	only	competition	and	contestability	in	public	services,	but	the
essential	idea	that	public	servants	are	motivated	by	self-interest	rather	than	altruism	–	and	must	be	subject	to	a
regime	of	performance	management,	inspection	and	scrutiny.	Moreover,	these	professionals	have	to	be	told	not
only	which	targets	to	meet,	but	how	to	go	about	meeting	them	through	detailed	prescription	of	professional	practice.
NPM	has	long	resembled	a	curious	hybrid	of	planning	and	markets.	On	the	one	hand,	Dominic	Cummings	rails
against,	‘the	hubristic	belief	that	politician-bureaucrats	are	able	to	outperform	markets	as	information	processors’.
On	the	other	hand,	government	at	the	centre	wants	to	prescribe	how	public	services	should	deliver,	using	the
allocation	of	resources	as	the	lever	to	control	performance.	The	long-term	consequence	is	organisational	confusion
and	fragmentation.	NPM	exacerbates	the	disconnection	between	government	policy-makers	at	the	centre,	and
‘street-level’	bureaucrats	responsible	for	delivering	change	in	public	services	on	the	ground.
It	is	apparent	that	a	decade	of	austerity	has	hollowed-out	the	civil	service.	The	numbers	of	civil	servants	employed
in	central	government	departments	and	agencies	fell	from	470,000	in	2010	to	380,000	by	2019.	The	core	of
policymakers	in	Whitehall	who	advise	Ministers	now	comprise	fewer	than	20,000	civil	servants.	It	is	a	mistake	to
equate	numbers	with	effectiveness.	Yet	there	is	strong	evidence	that	Whitehall	is	now	seriously	depleted,	shorn	of
the	capacities	and	human	capital	required	to	effectively	develop	policy.	Moreover,	the	erosion	of	government
capabilities	makes	it	even	harder	to	tackle	‘wicked	problems’	from	acquisitive	crime	to	long-term	unemployment.
The	failure	to	tackle	urgent	challenges	erodes	democratic	legitimacy.	Whitehall	is	losing	the	ability	to	procure	goods
and	services	effectively,	to	instigate	collaboration	between	the	public	and	private	sectors,	and	to	incentivise
research	and	innovation.	The	point	is	underlined	by	the	growing	dependence	of	UK	governments	on	management
consultancies	not	only	to	strengthen	delivery	and	implementation,	but	to	provide	ministerial	policy	and	strategy
advice.	The	failure	to	tackle	urgent	challenges	erodes	democratic	legitimacy.
It	is	illusory	to	believe	that	all	of	these	problems	would	be	solved	if	Britain	returned	to	the	‘golden	era’	of	the	post-
war	consensus,	where	Whitehall	operated	in	a	culture	in	which,	‘civil	servants	advise	and	Ministers	decide’.	Nor	is	it
sufficient	simply	to	attack	the	ideas	of	incumbent	reformers	such	as	Cummings.	In	the	current	climate,	Britain	needs
a	system	of	government	which	is	better	able	to	solve	problems	–	which	is	holistic,	anticipatory,	and	intelligent,
rooted	in	the	commitment	to	systematic	learning.	In	this	regard,	it	is	important	to	be	realistic	about	the	nature	of
government	in	modern	societies.	Governing	is	clearly	not	like	running	a	large	corporation.	Managing	complex
societies	is	a	political	activity	that	involves	making	choices,	while	wrestling	with	apparently	intractable	dilemmas.
Politicians	cannot	afford	to	take	risks	that	imperil	their	long-term	electoral	performance,	nor	can	they	simply	ignore
the	mandate	secured	at	the	ballot	box.	Politicians	are	not	technocrats.	They	have	to	display	the	qualities	of	what
Max	Weber	termed	‘charisma’,	using	passion	and	persuasion	to	win	over	the	public	at	large.	Yet	if	crises	provide
windows	of	opportunity	for	systemic	reform,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	waste	the	current	moment	to	overhaul	the	UK’s
governance	machinery.
Holistic	governance
Historically,	the	structure	of	British	government	has	been	notoriously	fragmented	and	disparate.	The	Haldane	report
published	in	the	aftermath	of	the	First	World	War	recommended	the	creation	of	government	departments	organised
around	basic	functional	demarcations.	In	the	intervening	decades,	however,	it	became	clear	that	functional
governance	creates	‘silos’	in	which	problems	fall	between	the	cracks,	and	no	department	or	agency	has
responsibility	for	tackling	societal	problems.	There	is	a	co-ordination	deficit	where	no	single	Minister	or	department
is	in	charge.	These	governance	weaknesses	have	been	acknowledged	and	debated	for	decades	in	Britain,	but
appear	ever	more	acute	today	in	the	light	of	COVID-19.
The	problems	of	fragmentation	have	been	exacerbated	by	the	use	of	outsourcing	to	operate	contact-tracing	call
centres	through	private	sector	providers,	for	example,	which	only	intensifies	the	challenge	of	co-ordination	and
weak	steering.	Instead,	government	needs	to	be	‘holistic’,	joining-up	departments,	agencies	and	tiers	of
government	across	the	public	policy	landscape,	focused	on	solving	problems	rather	than	narrow	administrative
functions.	The	Blair	governments	grappled	with	these	issues	after	the	1997	election,	as	Perri	6	noted	in	his	ground-
breaking	work	for	Demos,	but	they	fell	short	by	dismissing	necessarily	radical	changes	as	a	distraction	from	the
core	business	of	governing.	The	entire	system	of	Whitehall	departments	needs	to	be	refocused	to	concentrate	with
renewed	vigour	on	long-standing	economic	and	social	problems,	many	of	which	have	been	exacerbated	by	the
current	crisis.
Anticipatory	governance
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Government	in	Britain	also	remains	notoriously	short-termist.	Departments	still	concentrate	on	providing	services
that	are	overwhelmingly	‘curative’,	focused	on	intervening	after	the	event.	Where	governance	ought	to	be
preventative,	identifying	and	tackling	problems	before	they	become	more	acute,	the	horizon	in	which	government
and	public	services	think	appears	to	have	narrowed	even	further.	The	situation	is	exemplified	by	the	arbitrary
100,000	target	for	COVID-19	testing	which	the	Department	of	Health	was	forced	to	announce	in	April	as	a	result	of
the	chronic	shortage	of	testing	capacity	in	the	UK.
Government	at	all	levels	needs	to	deepen	its	capacity	for	‘upstream’	thinking.	Clearly	a	much	greater	focus	on
managing	risk	is	essential	in	the	aftermath	of	COVID-19.	Every	department	and	agency	should	be	required	to
allocate	a	proportion	of	its	annual	budget	to	activities	that	focus	explicitly	on	prevention.	The	importance	of
preventative	roles	in	public	services	needs	to	be	strengthened	by	addressing	the	existing	structure	of	pay,	rewards
and	status.	For	example,	public	health	professionals	ought	to	be	accorded	much	greater	prominence	and	influence
within	the	health	and	social	care	system.	Another	area	in	which	momentum	appears	to	have	been	lost	in	recent
years	is	strengthening	early	intervention	through	the	design	of	public	services,	particularly	focusing	resources	on
programmes	targeted	at	children	and	young	people,	alongside	older	individuals	at	risk	of	developing	chronic
conditions.
Intelligent	governance
As	well	as	being	holistic	and	anticipatory,	British	government	has	to	develop	its	capability	to	think	and	act
intelligently.	British	exceptionalism,	the	belief	that	the	UK	has	little	to	learn	from	other	countries	across	the	world	in
managing	risks	including	global	pandemics,	has	proved	to	be	extremely	damaging.	Whitehall	has	to	rebuild	its
capacity	for	effective	policy	learning,	particularly	in	understanding	what	lessons	can	be	drawn	from	policy	initiatives
and	programmes	tried	and	tested	in	other	countries.	The	literature	on	‘collective	intelligence’	demonstrates	the
importance	of	groups	collaborating	and	acting	collectively	across	borders	to	advance	knowledge	and	understanding
of	policy	problems.	That	also	includes	building	greater	capacity	for	policy	experimentation,	testing	policy	ideas	using
an	identified	sample	before	launching	policies	at	scale	using	techniques	such	as	Randomised	Control	Trials	and
quasi-experimental	designs.
At	the	same	time,	there	appears	to	be	less	focus	on	UK	engagement	in	global	co-operation	on	public	policies.	Yet
intelligent	governance	requires	effective	use	of	networks	of	expertise,	both	domestically	and	internationally.
Essential	too	are	mechanisms	for	citizens	to	engage	with	experts	and	decision-makers,	using	deliberative	forums	to
wrestle	with	and	solve	long-term	challenges	from	the	financing	of	social	care	to	dealing	with	climate	change	–
creating	new	models	of	deliberative	policy-making.	In	Britain,	local	government	is	currently	leading	the	way	in
advancing	deliberative	governance.
Reforming	institutions
The	former	US	Secretary	of	State,	Henry	Kissinger,	has	argued	that	the	pandemic	exposes	the	limitations	of
existing	institutions	in	western	countries,	both	public	and	private.	The	system	of	government	that	emerges	from	the
current	crisis	is	almost	certain	to	look	very	different	to	the	market	state	that	dominated	politics	for	the	last	forty	years
in	the	West.	Certainly,	past	world	wars	led	to	the	radical	reshaping	of	Whitehall	and	British	governance.	More
outsiders	or	‘irregulars’	were	brought	in.	Domestic	policy	was	overseen	by	a	single	Minister	at	the	centre	focused	on
departmental	co-ordination.	The	state	that	emerges	from	the	current	‘perfect	storm’	will	not	be	a	reversion	to	the
social	democratic	governments	of	the	post-war	era.	The	continuing	reform	and	strengthening	of	institutions	will	be
vital	to	ensure	we	are	better	prepared	to	face	the	next	crisis	–	in	whatever	form	it	takes.
_____________________
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